HANDBOOK OF GAME THEORY
with Economic Applications

Editors: Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart

Publisher: Elsevier Science Publishers (North-Holland)

Table of Contents

• Preface to Volume 1
  ROBERT J. AUMANN and SERGIU HART

1. The Game of Chess
   HERBERT A. SIMON and JONATHAN SCHAEFFER
   
   
2. Games in Extensive and Strategic Forms
   SERGIU HART
   
   
3. Games with Perfect Information
   JAN MYCIELSKI
   
   
4. Repeated Games with Complete Information
   SYLVAIN SORIN
   
   
5. Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: Zero-Sum
   SHMUEL ZAMIR
   
   
6. Repeated Games of Incomplete Information: Non-Zero-Sum
   FRANÇOISE FORGES
   
   
7. Noncooperative Models of Bargaining
   KEN BINMORE, MARTIN J. OSBORNE and ARIEL RUBINSTEIN
   
   
8. Strategic Analysis of Auctions
   ROBERT WILSON
   
   
9. Location
   JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ and JACQUES-FRANÇOIS THISSE
   
   
10. Strategic Models of Entry Deterrence
    ROBERT WILSON
    
    
11. Patent Licensing
    MORTON I. KAMIEN
    
    
12. The Core and Balancedness
    YAKAR KANNAI
    
    
13. Axiomatizations of the Core
    BEZALEL PELEG
    
    
14. The Core in Perfectly Competitive Economies
    ROBERT M. ANDERSON
    
    
15. The Core in Imperfectly Competitive Economies
    JEAN J. GABSZEWICZ and BENYAMIN SHITOVITZ
    
    
16. Two-Sided Matching
    ALVIN E. ROTH and MARILDA SOTOMAYOR
    
    
17. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets
    WILLIAM F. LUCAS
    
    
18. The Bargaining Set, Kernel, and Nucleolus
    MICHAEL MASCHLER
    
    
19. Game and Decision Theoretic Models in Ethics
    JOHN C. HARSANYI
    
    

• Preface to Volume 2
  ROBERT J. AUMANN and SERGIU HART

20. Zero-Sum Two-Person Games
    T. E. S. RAGHAVAN

21. Game Theory and Statistics
    GIDEON SCHWARZ

22. Differential Games
    AVNER FRIEDMAN

23. Differential Games -- Economic Applications
    SIMONE CLEMHOUT and HENRY Y. WAN Jr.

24. Communication, Correlated Equilibria, and Incentive Compatibility
    ROGER B. MYERSON

25. Signalling
    DAVID M. KREPS and JOEL SOBEL

26. Moral Hazard
    PRAJIT K. DUTTA and ROY RADNER

27. Search
    JOHN MCMILLAN and MICHAEL ROTHSCHILD

28. Game Theory and Evolutionary Biology
    PETER HAMMERSTEIN and REINHARD SELTEN

29. Game Theory Models of Peace and War
    BARRY O'NEILL

30. Voting Procedures
    STEVEN J. BRAMS

31. Social Choice
    HERVÉ MOULIN

32. Power and Stability in Politics
    PHILIP D. STRAFFIN Jr.

33. Game Theory and Public Economics
    MORDECAI KURZ

34. Cost Allocation
    H. P. YOUNG

35. Cooperative Models of Bargaining
    WILLIAM THOMSON

36. Games in Coalitional Form
    ROBERT J. WEBER

37. Coalition Structures
    JOSEPH GREENBERG

38. Game-Theoretic Aspects of Computing
    NATHAN LINIAL

39. Utility and Subjective Probability
    PETER C. FISHBURN

40. Common Knowledge
    JOHN GEANAKOPLOS

• Preface to Volume 3
  ROBERT J. AUMANN and SERGIU HART

41. Strategic Equilibrium
    ERIC VAN DAMME
    
    
42. Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium
    JOHN HILLAS and ELON KOHLBERG
    
    
43. Incomplete Information
    ROBERT J. AUMANN and AVIAD HEIFETZ
    
    
44. Non-Zero-Sum Two-Person Games
    T. E. S. RAGHAVAN
    
    
45. Computing Equilibria for Two-Person Games
    BERNHARD VON STENGEL
    
    
46. Non-Cooperative Games with Many Players
    M. ALI KHAN and YENENG SUN
    
    
47. Stochastic Games
    JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS
    
    
48. Stochastic Games: Recent Results
    NICOLAS VIEILLE
    
    
49. Game Theory and Industrial Organization
    KYLE BAGWELL and ASHER WOLINSKY
    
    
50. Bargaining with Incomplete Information
    LAWRENCE M. AUSUBEL, PETER CRAMTON and RAYMOND J. DENECKERE
    
    
51. Inspection Games
    RUDOLF AVENHAUS, BERNHARD VON STENGEL and SHMUEL ZAMIR
    
    
52. Economic History and Game Theory
    AVNER GREIF
    
    
53. The Shapley Value
    EYAL WINTER
    
    
54. Variations on the Shapley Value
    DOV MONDERER and DOV SAMET
    
    
55. Values of Non-Transferable Utility Games
    RICHARD MCLEAN
    
    
56. Values of Games with Infinitely Many Players
    ABRAHAM NEYMAN
    
    
57. Values of Perfectly Competitive Economies
    SERGIU HART
    
    
58. Some Other Economic Applications of the Value
    JEAN-FRANÇOIS MERTENS
    
    
59. Strategic Aspects of Political Systems
    JEFFREY BANKS
    
    
60. Game-Theoretic Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions
    JEAN-PIERRE BENOIT and LEWIS A. KORNHAUSER
    
    
61. Implementation Theory
    THOMAS R. PALFREY
    
    
62. Game Theory and Experimental Gaming
    MARTIN SHUBIK