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2) “Markets with countably many commodities” (paper No. 27), in General Equilibrium Theory, Volume III, edited by G. Debreu, Edward Elgar , Cheltenham (1996), pp. 121-129. (Elgar reference collection: International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Volume 67.)
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4) “An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments “(paper No. 62), in Game and Economic Theory (selected contributions in honor of Robert J. Aumann), edited by S. Hart and A. Neyman, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor (1995), pp. 265-278.
5) “An axiomatization of the Walras correspondence in infinite dimensional spaces” (paper No. 94), in The Legacy of Leon Walras, Volume 2, edited by D. A. Walker, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (2001) pp. 618-629. (Elgar reference collection: Intellectual Legacies in Modern Economics, Volume 7.)
6) “Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights” (paper No. 96), in Freedom in Economics (new perspectives in normative analysis), edited by J.-F Laslier, M.Fleurbaey N. Gravel, and A. Trannoy, Routledge, London (1998), pp. 116-132.
7) “Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust” (paper No. 102), in Trust, edited by E. L. Khalil, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (2003), pp.631-658. (Elgar reference collection: Critical Studies in Economic Institutions, Volume 14.)