List of Publications
BOOKS
PAPERS
"On the set of solvable n-person Games," Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 65 (1959), 380-383.
"von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments", Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 66 (1960), 173-179 (with R. J. Aumann).
"Existence theorem for the bargaining set M1(i) ", Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 69 (1963), 109-110.
"Solutions to cooperative games without side payments", Trans. Amer. Math. Soc., 106 (1963), 280-292.
"Quota games with a continuum of players", Israel J. Math., 1 (1963), 48-53.
"Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments", Israel J. Math., 1 (1963), 197-200.
"On the bargaining set M 0 of m-quota games", Advances in Game Theory, Ann. Of Math. Study 52, Princeton University Press, 1964, 501-512.
"The kernel of m-quota games", Can. J. Math., 17 (1965), 239-244.
"Ultimate-definite and symmetric-definite events and automata", J. Assoc. Computing Machinery, 12 (1965), 399-410 (with A. Paz).
"Utility functions of money for clear games", Nav. Res. Log. Quart., 12 (1965), 5763.
"An inductive method for constructing minimal balanced collections of finite sets", Nav. Res. Log. Quart., 12 (1965), 155-162.
"A method for computing the kernel of n-person games", Mathematics of Computation, 19 (1965), 531-551 (with R. J. Aumann and P. Rabinowitz).
"The kernel of the composition of characteristic function games", Israel J. Math., 3 (1965), 127-138.
"On the kernel of constant-sum simple games with homogenous weights", Ill. J. Math., 10 (1966), 39-48.
"A Characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game", Pacific J. Math., 18 (1966), 289-328 (With M. Maschler).
"The kernel of the general sum four-person game", Can. J. Math., 18 (1996), 673-677.
"The independence of game theory of utility theory", Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 72 (1966), 995-999.
"Existence theorem for the bargaining set M (i) ", (a detailed version of 3), Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of O. Morgenstern, ed. M. Shubik, Princeton University Press, 1967, 53-56.
"Equilibrium points for open acyclic relations", Can. J. Math., 19 (1967), 366-369.
"The structure of the kernel of a cooperative game", J. Soc. Indust. Appl. Math., 15 (1967), 569-604 (with M. Maschler).
"On concatenative decompositions of regular events", IEEETC, C-17, (1968), 229-237 (with A. Paz).
"On minimal separating collections", Proc. Amer. Math. Soc., 19 (1968), 26-30.
"Centralized games", J. Soc. Indust. Appl. Math., 16 (1968), 102-104.
"On weights of constant-sum majority games", J. Soc. Indust. Appl. Math., 16 (1968), 527-532.
"Equilibrium points for games with infinitely many players", J. London Math. Soc., 44 (1969), 292-294.
"Utility functions for partially ordered topological spaces", Econometrica, 38 (1970), 93-96.
"Markets with countably many commodities", International Economic Review, 11 (1970), 369-377 (with M. E. Yaari).
"Efficiency prices for optimal consumption plans", J. Math. Anal. Appl., 29 (1970), 83-90.
"Efficiency prices for optimal consumption plans III", J. Math. Anal. Appl., 32 (1970), 630-638.
"Efficiency prices in an infinite-dimensional space", J. Economic Theory, 2 (1970), 4185 (with M. E. Yaari).
"Efficiency prices for optimal consumption plan II", Israel J. Math., 9 (1971), 222-234.
"On optimal consumption plans in a multi-sector economy", The Review of Economic Studies, 39 (1972), 159-169 (with H.E. Ryder, Jr.).
"The kernel and bargaining set for convex games", International Journal of Game Theory, 1 (1972), 73-93 (with M. Maschler and L. S. Shapley).
"Efficiency prices for optimal consumption plan IV", Siam J. Control, 10 (1972), 414-433.
"Topological properties of the efficient point set", Proc. Amer. Math. Soc., 35 (1972), 531-536.
"Price properties of optimal consumption programs", in Models of Economic Growth, edited by J. A. Mirrlees and N. H. Stern, Macmillan, London, 1973, 306-317 (with M. E. Yaari).
"On the existence of a consistent course of action when tastes are changing", The Review of Economic Studies, 40 (1973), 391-401 (with M. E. Yaari).
"A weakly maximal golden rule programme for a multi-sector economy", International Economic Review, 14 (1973), 574-579.
"On competitive prices for optimal consumption plans", SIAM Journal of Applied Math., 26 (1974), 239-253.
"The Modified golden-rule of a multi-sector economy", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1 (1974), 193-198 (with H. E. Ryder, Jr.).
"A note on Gale's example", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1 (1974), 209-211 (with R. J. Aumann).
"Efficiency analysis for multi-variate distributions", The Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1975), 87-91 (with D. Levhari and J. Paroush).
"A price characterization of efficient random variables", Econometrica, 43 (1975), 283292 (with M. E. Yaari).
"Efficient random variables", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2 (1975), 243-252.
"Stable sets and stable points of set-valued dynamic systems with applications to game theory", SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, 14 (1976), 985-995 (with M. Maschler).
"On competitive prices for optimal consumption plans II", SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, 32 (1977), 627-630 (with I. Zilcha).
"Topological properties of the efficient point set II", Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 63 (1978), 377-384.
"Consistent voting systems", Econometrica, 46 (1978), 153-161.
"Representations of simple games by social choice functions", International Journal of Games Theory, 7 (1978), 81-94.
"Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus, and related solution concepts", Mathematics of Operations Research, 4 (1979), 303-338 (with M. Maschler and L. S. Shapley).
"A note on manipulability of large voting schemes", Theory and Decision, 11 (1979), 401-412.
"Game theoretic analysis of voting Schemes", in Game Theory and Related Topics, eds. O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979, 83-89.
"An approach to the problem of efficient distribution of the labor force", in Applied Game Theory, eds. S. J. Brams, A. Schotter and G. Schwodiauer, Physica-Verlag, Vienna, 1979, 214-235 (with Y. Kannai).
"A theory of coalition formation in committees", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 7 (1980), 115-134.
"Coalition formation in simple games with dominant players", International Journal of Game Theory, 10 (1981), 11-33.
"Monotonicity properties of social choice correspondences", in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, eds. O. Moeschlin and D. Pallaschke, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1981, 97-101.
"Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1982), 115-145 (with H. Moulin).
"On simple games and social choice correspondences", in Social Choice and Welfare, eds. P. K. Pattanaik and M. Salles, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1983, 251-268.
"A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set", Journal of Economic Theory, 32 (1984), 172-175 (with Y. Kannai).
"An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set", Social Choice and Welfare, 1 (1984), 113-122 (with P. K. Pattanaik).
"Core stability and duality of effectivity functions", in Selected Topics in Operations Research and Mathematical Economics, eds. G. Hammer and D. Pallaschke, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1984, 272-287.
"An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 14, (1985), 203-214.
"A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a non Neumann-Morgenstern solution", Mathematical Social Sciences, 11 (1986), 83-87.
"On the reduced game property and its converse", International Journal of Game Theory, 15 (1986), 187-200. A correction: International Journal of Game Theory, 16 (1987), 290.
"Distribution of power under stochastic social choice rules", Econometrica, 54 (1986), 909-921 (with P. K. Pattanaik).
"Coalition-proof Nash equilibria – I. Concepts", Journal of Economic Theory, 42 (1987), 1-12 (with B. D. Bernheim and M. D. Whinston).
"Cores and capacities of compound simple games", Social Choice and Welfare, (1987), 307-316.
"Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees", Social Choice and Welfare, 5 (1988), 261-279 (with C. d'Aspremont).
"Paths leading to the Nash set", in The Shapley value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley, ed. A. E. Roth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, 321-330 (with M. Maschler and G. Owen).
"An axiomatization of the core of market games", Mathematics of Operations Research, 14 (1989), 448-456. A correction: Mathematics of Operations Research, 18 (1993), 765.
"Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences" Social Choice and Welfare, 7 (1990), 31-38 (with S. Barberà).
"Axiomatizations of the core, the nucleolus, and the prekernel", in Game Theory and Applications, eds. T. Ichiishi, A. Neyman and Y. Tauman, Academic Press, New York, 1990, 176-182.
"A solution to the problem of mass elections", in Issues in Contemporary Economics, Volume 1: Markets and Welfare, ed. K. J. Arrow, Macmillan, London, 1991, 287-294.
"Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games", Journal of Economic Theory, 53 (1991), 328-344 (with E. Einy).
"Short-run stable matchings between bees and flowers", Games and Economic Behavior, 4 (1992), 232-251 (with A. Shmida).
"On perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria", in Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honor of David Gale, ed. M. Majumdar, Macmillan, London, 1992, 259-268.
"A note on optimal development in a multi-sector nonconvex economy", in Equilibrium and Dynamics: Essays in Honor of David Gale, ed. M. Majumdar, Macmillan, London, 1992, 241-246 (with M. Majumdar).
"Voting by count and account", in Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi, ed. R. Selten, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1992, 45-51.
"Foraging graphs: constraint rules on matching between bees and flowers in a two sided pollination market", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 157 (1992), 191-201 (with A. Shmida and S. Ellner).
"The least-core, nucleolus, and kernel of homogenous weighted majority games", Games and Economic Behavior, 4 (1992). 588-605 (with J. Rosenmüller).
"Axiomatizations of the core", in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol. 1, eds. R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1992, 398-412.
"The kernel of homogenous games with steps", in Essays in Game Theory in Honor of M. Maschler, ed. N. Megiddo, Springer Verlag, Berlin, 1994, 163-192. (with J. Rosenmüller and P. Sudhölter).
"Coalition-proof communication equilibria", in Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics, eds. W. A. Barnett, H. Moulin, M. Salles, and N. J. Schofield, Cambridge University Press 1995, 289-300 (with E. Einy).
"Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees", Journal of Theoretical Biology, 175 (1995), 305-316 (with F. Thijsman, M. Amitai, and A. Shmida).
"The consistency principle for games in strategic form", International Journal of Game Theory, 25 (1996), 13-34 (with S. Tijs).
"Minimality of consistent solutions for strategic games", Economic Theory, 7 (1996), 81-93 (with J. Potters and S. Tijs).
"Axiomatic characterization of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 25 (1996), 355-372 (with A. van den Nouweland and S. Tijs).
"Axiomatic characterization of solutions for extended Bayesian games", Theory and Decision, 40 (1996), 103-129 (with R. Heumen, S. Tijs and P. Borm).
"On ring formation in auctions", Mathematical Social Sciences, 32 (1996), 1-37 (with W. Güth).
"A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium", Economic Design, 2 (1996), 89-97.
"Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism", Economic Design, 2 (1996), 311-324.
"Strict and symmetric correlated equilibria are the distributions of the ESS's of biological conflicts with asymmetric roles", in Understanding Strategic Interaction, Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, eds., W. Albers, W. Güth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu, and E. van Damme, Springer-Verlag 1997, 149-170 (with A. Shmida).
"An axiomatization of Nash equilibria in economic situations", Games and Economic Behavior, 18 (1997), 277-285, (with P. Sudhölter).
"An axiomatization of the Walras correspondence in infinite dimensional spaces", International Economic Review, 38 (1997), 853-864 (with M. Majumdar).
"A difficulty with Nash's program: a proof of a special case", Economics Letters, 55 (1997), 305-308.
"Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights", Social Choice and Welfare, 15 (1998), 67-80.
"Nucleoli as maximizers of collective satisfaction functions", Social Choice and Welfare 15 (1998), 383-411 (with P. Sudhölter). A correction: Social Choice and Welfare, 17 (2000), 379-380.
"Almost all equilibria in dominant strategies are coalition-proof", Economics Letters, 60 (1998), 157-162.
"The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games", International Journal of Game Theory, 27 (1998), 37-47 (with P. Borm, G.-J. Otten, S. Tijs).
"The canonical extensive form of a game form: symmetries", in Current Trends in Economics: Theory and Applications, eds. A. Alkan, C. D. Aliprantis and N. C. Yannelis, Springer-Verlag, 1999, 367-387 (with J. Rosenmüller and P. Sudhölter).
"Single- peakedness and coalition-proofness", Review of Economic Design, 4 (1999), 381-387 (with P. Sudhölter).
"Co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust", German Economic Review, 1 (2000), 83-110 (with W. Güth and H. Kliemt).
"The canonical extensive form of a game form: Part II-representation", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 33 (2000), 299-338 (with J. Rosenmüller and P. Sudhölter).
"Correlated equilibria of games with many players", International Journal of Game Theory, 29 (2000), 375-389 (with H. Keiding).
"The positive prekernel of a cooperative game", International Game Theory Review, 2 (2000), 287-305 (with P. Sudhölter).
"Reconciling power and equality in international organizations: A voting method from Rabbi Krochmal of Kremsier", Jewish Political Studies Review, 12 (2000), 67-81 (with B. O'Neill).
"On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game", International Journal of Game Theory, 30 (2001), 147-165 (with J. L. Hougaard and L. Thorlund-Petersen).
"Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 36 (2001), 117-140 (with H. Keiding).
"When will payoff maximization survive? An indirect evolutionary analysis", Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 11 (2001), 479-499 (with W. Güth).
"Representation of effectivity functions in coalition proof Nash equilibrium: A complete characterization", Social Choice and Welfare, 19 (2002), 241-263 (with H. Keiding).
"Nash Consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox", Mathematical Social Sciences, 43 (2002), 267-287 (with H. Peters and T. Storcken).
"Game-theoretic analysis of voting in committees" in Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1, eds. K. J. Arrow, A. K. Sen, and K. Suzumura, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2002, 395-423.
"A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games", Mathematics of Operations Research, 27 (2002), 441-444 (with P. Sudhölter).
"Constitutional implementation", Review of Economic Design, 7 (2002), 187-204 (with E. Winter).
"The dummy paradox of the bargaining set", in Game Theory and Applications, Vol. 8, eds. L. A. Petrosjan and V. V. Mazalov, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2002, 119-124 (with P. Sudhölter).
"Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization", Mathematical Social Sciences, 47 (2004), 275-287.
"On the non-emptiness of the Mas-Colell bargaining set", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 41 (2005), 1060-1068 (with P. Sudhölter).
"The Dutta-Ray solution on the class of convex games: a generalization and monotonicity properties", International Game Theory Review, 7 (2005), 431-442 (with J. L. Hougaard and L. P. Osterdal).
"Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences", International Journal of Game Theory, 33 (2005), 381-396 (with H. Peters and T. Storcken).
"On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions", Journal of Mathematical Economics, 42 (2006), 827-842 (with H. Keiding).
"Binary effectivity rules", Review of Economic Design, 10 (2006), 167-181 (with H. Keiding).
"Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters", Social Choice and Welfare, 27 (2006), 477-492 (with H. Peters).
"Bargaining sets of majority voting games", Mathematics of Operations Research, 32 (2007), 857-872 (with R. Holzman and P. Sudhölter).
"Lexicographic composition of simple games", Games and Economic Behavior, 62 (2008), 628-642 (with B. O'Neill).
"Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models", Games and Economic Behavior, 65 (2009), 503-515 (with H. Peters).
"Implementation by mediated equilibrium", International Journal of Game Theory, 39 (2010), 191-207 (with A. D. Procaccia).
"Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury", Social Choice and Welfare , 39 (2012) , 91-126 (with S. Zamir).