Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction
Sergiu Hart
Abstract
The backward induction (or subgame-perfect)
equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique
evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models
consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is
low and the populations are large.
Keywords:
games in
extensive form, games of perfect information, backward induction
equilibrium, subgame-perfect equilibrium, evolutionary dynamics,
evolutionary stability, mutation, selection, population games
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers:
C7, D7, C6
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Games and Economic Behavior 41 (2002), 2, 227-264
Related papers:
-
Ziv Gorodeisky,
"Evolutionary Stability for Large Populations",
Mathematics of Operations Research 31 (2006), 369-380
-
Tomer Wexler,
"Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games
with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria",
Center for Rationality DP-402 (September 2005)