



Calibration, Forecast-Hedging, and Nash Dynamics

Sergiu Hart

June 2025

Nash 75 @ Oxford



Calibration, Forecast-Hedging, and Nash Dynamics

Sergiu Hart

Center for the Study of Rationality
Dept of Mathematics Dept of Economics
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

hart@huji.ac.il

<http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart>



Joint work with

Dean P. Foster

**University of Pennsylvania &
Amazon Research NY**



Papers

The image features a decorative header at the top left. It consists of a triangle with a gradient from yellow to orange, pointing to the right. Below this triangle is a dark gray L-shaped border that extends across the top and down the left side of the page. The word "Papers" is written in a dark brown, serif font within the yellow part of the triangle.

Papers

- Sergiu Hart
“Calibration: The Minimax Proof”, 1995 [2021]
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/publ.html#calib-minmax

Papers

- Sergiu Hart
“Calibration: The Minimax Proof”, 1995 [2021]
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/publ.html#calib-minmax
- Dean P. Foster and Sergiu Hart
“Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics”
Games and Economic Behavior 2018
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/publ.html#calib-eq

Papers



The header features a yellow-to-orange gradient triangle on the left, with the word "Papers" in a dark brown serif font. Below the triangle are three horizontal dark gray lines of varying lengths. A vertical dark gray line runs down the left side of the page, and a horizontal dark gray line runs across the bottom right corner.

Papers

- Dean P. Foster and Sergiu Hart
“Forecast Hedging and Calibration”
Journal of Political Economy 2021

www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/publ.html#calib-int

Papers

- Dean P. Foster and Sergiu Hart
“Forecast Hedging and Calibration”
Journal of Political Economy 2021
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/publ.html#calib-int
- Dean P. Foster and Sergiu Hart
“ ‘Calibeating’: Beating Forecasters at Their Own Game”
Theoretical Economics 2023
www.ma.huji.ac.il/hart/publ.html#calib-beat

Calibration

The slide features a decorative header at the top left. It consists of a triangle with a yellow-to-orange gradient, pointing to the right. Below this triangle is a dark gray L-shaped line that extends horizontally across the top and then vertically down the left side of the slide. In the bottom right corner, there is another dark gray L-shaped line, pointing towards the bottom right.

Calibration

- Forecaster says: “***The probability of rain tomorrow is p*** ”

Calibration

- Forecaster says: “*The probability of rain tomorrow is p* ”
- Forecaster is **CALIBRATED** if

Calibration

- Forecaster says: “*The probability of rain tomorrow is p* ”
- Forecaster is **CALIBRATED** if
 - for every forecast p :
in the days when the forecast was p , the proportion of rainy days equals p

Calibration

- Forecaster says: “*The probability of rain tomorrow is p* ”
- Forecaster is **CALIBRATED** if
 - for every forecast p :
in the days when the forecast was p , the proportion of rainy days equals p
(or: is close to p in the long run)

Calibration



Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be)

Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be) *

* **NON-Bayesian, NO statistical assumptions !**

Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be)

Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be)

- Foster and Vohra 1994 [publ 1998]

Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be)

- Foster and Vohra 1994 [publ 1998]
- Hart 1995: proof by Minimax Theorem

Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be)

- Foster and Vohra 1994 [publ 1998]
- Hart 1995: proof by Minimax Theorem
- . . .

Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be)

- Foster and Vohra 1994 [publ 1998]
- Hart 1995: proof by Minimax Theorem
- . . .
- Hart and Mas-Colell 1996 [publ 2000]:
procedure by Blackwell's Approachability

Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be)

- Foster and Vohra 1994 [publ 1998]
- Hart 1995: proof by Minimax Theorem
- . . .
- Hart and Mas-Colell 1996 [publ 2000]:
procedure by Blackwell's Approachability
- Foster 1999: simple procedure

Calibration

CALIBRATION *can be guaranteed*
(no matter what the weather will be)

- Foster and Vohra 1994 [publ 1998]
- Hart 1995: proof by Minimax Theorem
- . . .
- Hart and Mas-Colell 1996 [publ 2000]:
procedure by Blackwell's Approachability
- Foster 1999: simple procedure
- Foster and Hart 2016 [publ 2021]: simplest
procedure, by "Forecast Hedging"


Forecast-Hedging



The header features a gradient bar transitioning from yellow on the left to orange on the right. Below this bar are several horizontal lines in dark gray and light gray. A thick dark gray vertical line runs down the left side of the slide, and a dark gray L-shaped corner bracket is positioned in the bottom right corner.


Forecast-Hedging

AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)




Forecast-Hedging

AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)




Forecast-Hedging

AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)




Forecast-Hedging

AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)




Forecast-Hedging

AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)



Forecast-Hedging


AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)



Calibration in Practice




Calibration in Practice



Calibration plots of FiveThirtyEight.com
(as of June 2019)

Calibration in Practice



Calibration plot of ElectionBettingOdds.com
(2016 – 2018)



No Calibration

No Calibration

- **CALIBRATION** *cannot* be guaranteed when:

No Calibration

- **CALIBRATION** *cannot* be guaranteed when:
 - Forecast is known before the rain/no-rain decision is made
("LEAKY FORECASTS")

No Calibration

- **CALIBRATION** *cannot* be guaranteed when:
 - Forecast is known before the rain/no-rain decision is made
("LEAKY FORECASTS")
 - Forecaster uses a *deterministic* forecasting procedure

No Calibration

- **CALIBRATION** *cannot* be guaranteed when:
 - Forecast is known before the rain/no-rain decision is made
("LEAKY FORECASTS")
 - Forecaster uses a *deterministic* forecasting procedure

Oakes 1985

Continuous Calibration



Continuous Calibration

- **CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION:** combine the days when the forecast was *close to p*

Continuous Calibration

- **CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION**: combine the days when the forecast was ***close to p*** (smooth out the calibration score)

Continuous Calibration

- **CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION**: combine the days when the forecast was *close to* p (smooth out the calibration score)
- **Theorem**:

There exists a *deterministic* procedure that is **CONTINUOUSLY CALIBRATED**.

Continuous Calibration

- **CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION**: combine the days when the forecast was *close to* p (smooth out the calibration score)
- **Theorem**:

There exists a *deterministic* procedure that is **CONTINUOUSLY CALIBRATED**.

Deterministic \Rightarrow holds also when the forecasts are “*leaked*”

Continuous Calibration

- **CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION**: combine the days when the forecast was *close to p* (smooth out the calibration score)
- **Theorem**:

There exists a *deterministic* procedure that is **CONTINUOUSLY CALIBRATED**.

Deterministic \Rightarrow holds also when the forecasts are “*leaked*”


Foster and Kakade (2004, 2006)
Foster and Hart (2018, **2021**)

Forecast-Hedging: Calibration



Forecast-Hedging: Calibration


AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)



perfect
calibration


Forecast-Hedging:

AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)




Forecast-Hedging: Continuous Calibration

AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)



Forecast-Hedging: Continuous Calibration

AVERAGE ACTION (= frequency of rain)



Forecast-Hedging



The header features a gradient bar transitioning from yellow on the left to orange on the right. Below this bar are several horizontal lines in dark gray and light gray. A thick dark gray vertical line runs down the left side of the slide, and another thick dark gray horizontal line runs along the bottom right corner.

Forecast-Hedging

In general (for dimension ≥ 2):

Forecast-Hedging

In general (for dimension ≥ 2):

- **STOCHASTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**

Forecast-Hedging

In general (for dimension ≥ 2):

- **STOCHASTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**
is obtained by finite **MINIMAX**

Forecast-Hedging

In general (for dimension ≥ 2):

- **STOCHASTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**
is obtained by finite **MINIMAX**
- **DETERMINISTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**

Forecast-Hedging

In general (for dimension ≥ 2):

- **STOCHASTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**
is obtained by finite **MINIMAX**
- **DETERMINISTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**
is obtained by continuous **FIXEDPOINT**

Forecast-Hedging

In general (for dimension ≥ 2):

- **STOCHASTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**
is obtained by finite **MINIMAX**
→ **MM procedures**
- **DETERMINISTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**
is obtained by continuous **FIXEDPOINT**

Forecast-Hedging

In general (for dimension ≥ 2):

- **STOCHASTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**
is obtained by finite **MINIMAX**
→ **MM procedures**
- **DETERMINISTIC FORECAST-HEDGING**
is obtained by continuous **FIXEDPOINT**
→ **FP procedures**

Forecast-Hedging



The header features a gradient bar transitioning from yellow on the left to orange on the right. Below this bar are several horizontal lines in dark gray and light gray. A thick dark gray vertical line runs down the left side of the slide, and a dark gray L-shaped bracket is located in the bottom right corner.

Forecast-Hedging

- forecasting ?

Forecast-Hedging

- fore-casting ?

Forecast-Hedging

- fore-casting ?
- **BACK-CASTING !**

Forecast-Hedging

- fore-casting ?
- **BACK-CASTING !**
("Politician's Lemma")

Continuous Calibration: Implications



Continuous Calibration: Implications

- For *forecasting*:

Continuous Calibration: Implications

- For *forecasting*:
 - nothing much ... (easier to pass the test)

Continuous Calibration: Implications

- For *forecasting*:
 - nothing much ... (easier to pass the test)
- For *game dynamics*:

Continuous Calibration: Implications

- For *forecasting*:
 - nothing much ... (easier to pass the test)
- For *game dynamics*:
 - Nash dynamics

Game Dynamics



Game Dynamics

General n -person game

Game Dynamics

General n -person game

- Players *forecast* the play in the next period

Game Dynamics

General n -person game

- Players *forecast* the play in the next period
- Players choose their actions in *response* to the forecasts

Game Dynamics

General n -person game

- Players *forecast* the play in the next period
 - *calibrated forecasts*
- Players choose their actions in *response* to the forecasts

Game Dynamics

General n -person game

- Players *forecast* the play in the next period
 - *calibrated forecasts*
- Players choose their actions in *response* to the forecasts
 - *best response*

Game Dynamics

General n -person game

- Players *forecast* the play in the next period
 - *calibrated forecasts*
- Players choose their actions in *response* to the forecasts
 - *best response*

⇒ Long-run play ?

Calibrated Learning



Calibrated Learning

- Each player makes a *δ -calibrated forecast* on the play of the other players in the next period

Calibrated Learning

- Each player makes a *δ -calibrated forecast* on the play of the other players in the next period
- Each player *best replies* to the forecast

Calibrated Learning

- Each player makes a *δ -calibrated forecast* on the play of the other players in the next period
- Each player *best replies* to the forecast

⇒ **TIME-AVERAGE OF PLAY**
(= empirical distribution of play)
is a **CORRELATED ϵ -EQUILIBRIUM**
in the long run

Calibrated Learning

- Each player makes a *δ -calibrated forecast* on the play of the other players in the next period
- Each player *best replies* to the forecast

⇒ **TIME-AVERAGE OF PLAY**
(= empirical distribution of play)
is a **CORRELATED ϵ -EQUILIBRIUM**
in the long run

Continuously Calibrated Learning



Continuously Calibrated Learning

- A *deterministic continuously calibrated forecast* on the play of all players in the next period

Continuously Calibrated Learning

- A *deterministic continuously calibrated forecast* on the play of all players in the next period
- Each player *continuously δ -best replies* to the forecast

Continuously Calibrated Learning

- A *deterministic continuously calibrated forecast* on the play of all players in the next period
- Each player *continuously δ -best replies* to the forecast

\Rightarrow **$1 - \epsilon$ OF THE TIME**
the play is a **NASH ϵ -EQUILIBRIUM**
in the long run (a.s.)

Continuously Calibrated Learning



Continuously Calibrated Learning

(F) A *continuously calibrated deterministic* procedure, which gives in each period t a "forecast" of play c_t in $\prod_{i \in N} \Delta(A^i)$

Continuously Calibrated Learning

- (F) A *continuously calibrated deterministic* procedure, which gives in each period t a "forecast" of play c_t in $\Pi_{i \in N} \Delta(A^i)$
- (P) A continuous *δ -best reply* mapping $g^i : \Pi_{i \in N} \Delta(A^i) \rightarrow \Delta(A^i)$ for each player i

Continuously Calibrated Learning

- (F) A *continuously calibrated deterministic* procedure, which gives in each period t a "forecast" of play c_t in $\Pi_{i \in N} \Delta(A^i)$
- (P) A continuous *δ -best reply* mapping $g^i : \Pi_{i \in N} \Delta(A^i) \rightarrow \Delta(A^i)$ for each player i

In each period t , each player i :

1. runs the procedure (F) to get c_t
2. plays $g^i(c_t)$ given by (P)

Continuously Calibrated Learning



Continuously Calibrated Learning

CONTINUOUSLY CALIBRATED LEARNING:

Continuously Calibrated Learning

CONTINUOUSLY CALIBRATED LEARNING:

- is a stochastic *uncoupled* dynamic

Continuously Calibrated Learning

CONTINUOUSLY CALIBRATED LEARNING:

- is a stochastic *uncoupled* dynamic
 - *Nash ϵ -equilibria are played at least $1 - \epsilon$ of the time*
in the long run (a.s.)

Continuously Calibrated Learning

Proof:

Continuously Calibrated Learning

Proof:

$$\text{play}_t = g(c_t)$$

Continuously Calibrated Learning

Proof:

● *continuous calibration*

$$\Rightarrow \text{play}_t = g(c_t) \approx c_t$$

Continuously Calibrated Learning

Proof:

- *continuous calibration*

$$\Rightarrow \text{play}_t = g(c_t) \approx c_t$$

- use: g is continuous

Continuously Calibrated Learning

Proof:

- ***continuous calibration***

$$\Rightarrow \text{play}_t = g(c_t) \approx c_t$$

- use: g is continuous

- ***g approximate best reply***

$$\Rightarrow \text{play}_t \text{ is an approximate Nash equilibrium}$$

Continuously Calibrated Learning

Proof:

- ***continuous calibration***

$$\Rightarrow \text{play}_t = g(c_t) \approx c_t$$

- use: g is continuous

- ***g approximate best reply***

$$\Rightarrow \text{play}_t \text{ is an approximate Nash equilibrium}$$

- $g(\text{play}_t) = g(g(c_t)) \approx g(c_t) = \text{play}_t$

Why Continuous ?



Why Continuous ?

- **CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION**

Why Continuous ?

- CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION
 - *deterministic*

Why Continuous ?

- CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION
 - *deterministic*
 - ⇒ *same* forecast for *all* players

Why Continuous ?

- CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION
 - *deterministic*
⇒ *same* forecast for *all* players
 - *leaky*

Why Continuous ?

- CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION

- *deterministic*

- ⇒ *same* forecast for *all* players

- *leaky*

- ⇒ actions *depend* on forecast

Why Continuous ?

- CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION

- *deterministic*

⇒ *same* forecast for *all* players

- *leaky*

⇒ actions *depend* on forecast

- *calibrated*

Why Continuous ?

- CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION

- *deterministic*

⇒ *same* forecast for *all* players

- *leaky*

⇒ actions *depend* on forecast

- *calibrated*

⇒ forecast *equals* actions

Why Continuous ?

- CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION

- *deterministic*

⇒ *same* forecast for *all* players

- *leaky*

⇒ actions *depend* on forecast

- *calibrated*

⇒ forecast *equals* actions

⇒ **FIXED POINT**

Why Continuous ?

- CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION

- *deterministic*

- ⇒ *same* forecast for *all* players

- *leaky*

- ⇒ actions *depend* on forecast

- *calibrated*

- ⇒ forecast *equals* actions

- ⇒ **FIXED POINT**

- CONTINUOUS BEST REPLY

Why Continuous ?

- **CONTINUOUS CALIBRATION**

- *deterministic*

- ⇒ *same* forecast for *all* players

- *leaky*

- ⇒ actions *depend* on forecast

- *calibrated*

- ⇒ forecast *equals* actions

- ⇒ **FIXED POINT**

- **CONTINUOUS BEST REPLY**

- ⇒ fixed point = **NASH EQUILIBRIUM**

Dynamics and Equilibrium



Dynamics and Equilibrium

"LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION":

Dynamics and Equilibrium

"LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION":

There must be some COORDINATION —

Dynamics and Equilibrium

"LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION":

There must be some COORDINATION —

either in the EQUILIBRIUM notion,

Dynamics and Equilibrium

"LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION":

There must be some COORDINATION —

either in the EQUILIBRIUM notion,

or in the DYNAMIC

Dynamics and Equilibrium

"LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION":

There must be some COORDINATION —

*either in the EQUILIBRIUM notion,
(CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM)*

or in the DYNAMIC

Dynamics and Equilibrium

"LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION":

There must be some COORDINATION —

*either in the EQUILIBRIUM notion,
(CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM)*

*or in the DYNAMIC
(NASH EQUILIBRIUM)*

Dynamics and Equilibrium

"LAW OF CONSERVATION OF COORDINATION":

There must be some COORDINATION —

*either in the EQUILIBRIUM notion,
(CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM)*

*or in the DYNAMIC
(NASH EQUILIBRIUM)*

(Hart and Mas-Colell 2003)

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria



Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

FIXEDPOINT universe

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging

FIXEDPOINT universe

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging
- *MM*-procedures

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging
- *MM*-procedures

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging
- *FP*-procedures

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging
- *MM*-procedures
- *classic*
calibration

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging
- *FP*-procedures

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging
- *MM*-procedures
- *classic*
calibration

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging
- *FP*-procedures
- *continuous*
calibration

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging
- *MM*-procedures
- *classic*
calibration
- *correlated* equilibria

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging
- *FP*-procedures
- *continuous*
calibration

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging
- *MM*-procedures
- *classic*
calibration
- *correlated* equilibria

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging
- *FP*-procedures
- *continuous*
calibration
- *Nash* equilibria

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging
- *MM*-procedures
- *classic*
calibration
- *correlated* equilibria
- *time-average*

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging
- *FP*-procedures
- *continuous*
calibration
- *Nash* equilibria

Calibration, Dynamics, Equilibria

MINIMAX universe

- *stochastic*
forecast-hedging
- *MM*-procedures
- *classic*
calibration
- *correlated* equilibria
- *time-average*

FIXEDPOINT universe

- *deterministic*
forecast-hedging
- *FP*-procedures
- *continuous*
calibration
- *Nash* equilibria
- *period-by-period*

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium



Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

Conference in Honor
of John Nash's 80th Birthday
Princeton University, June 2008

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

Conference in Honor
of John Nash's 80th Birthday
Princeton University, June 2008

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

Conference in Honor
of John Nash's 80th Birthday
Princeton University, June 2008

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** **general**, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

- **"general"** : in all games

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** **general**, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

- **"general"**: in all games
rather than: in specific classes of games

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics
leading to Nash equilibrium*

- *"leading to Nash equilibrium"*

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics
leading to Nash equilibrium*

- *"leading to Nash equilibrium"* :
at a Nash equilibrium (or close to it)
from some time on

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, **natural** dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

● *"natural"*

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, **natural** dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

● ***"natural"*** :

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, **natural** dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

- **"natural"** :
- **adaptive** (reacting, improving)

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, **natural** dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

- **"natural"** :
 - **adaptive** (reacting, improving)
 - **simple and efficient** (computation, time)

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, **natural** dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

● **"natural"** :

- **adaptive** (reacting, improving)
- **simple and efficient** (computation, time)
- **uncoupled**

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, **natural** dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

● **"natural"** :

- **adaptive** (reacting, improving)
- **simple and efficient** (computation, time)
- **uncoupled**
- . . .

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

RESULT

*There **CANNOT BE** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium

FACT

*There are **NO** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

RESULT

*There **CANNOT BE** general, natural dynamics leading to Nash equilibrium*

Hart and Mas-Colell (2003, 2006, 2013),
Hart and Mansour (2010),
Babichenko and Rubinstein (2022), ...

Continuously Calibrated Learning



Continuously Calibrated Learning

☒ **adaptive**

Continuously Calibrated Learning

- ☒ **adaptive**
- ☒ **uncoupled**

Continuously Calibrated Learning

- ☒ **adaptive**
- ☒ **uncoupled**
- ☐ **NOT simple** (fixedpoint at each step)

Continuously Calibrated Learning

- ☒ **adaptive**
- ☒ **uncoupled**
- ☐ **NOT simple** (fixedpoint at each step)
- ☐ **NOT "leading to Nash equilibrium"**
(only $1 - \varepsilon$ of the time)

Continuously Calibrated Learning

- ☒ **adaptive**
- ☒ **uncoupled**
- ☐ **NOT simple** (fixedpoint at each step)
- ☐ **NOT "leading to Nash equilibrium"**
(only $1 - \varepsilon$ of the time)
- ☒ **period-by-period behavior**



John Nash

John Nash



John Nash



my photo
of John Nash

John Nash



my photo
of John Nash
taking
my photo

John Nash



my photo
of John Nash
taking
my photo
of taking
his photo

John Nash



my photo
of John Nash
taking
my photo
of taking
his photo
of taking
my photo

...

John Nash Photo Equilibrium



my photo
of John Nash
taking
my photo
of taking
his photo
of taking
my photo

...

John Nash Photo Equilibrium



my photo
of John Nash
taking
my photo
of taking
his photo
of taking
my photo

...

Brazilian Game Theory Conference
São Paulo, August 2010