Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment
Sergiu Hart, Ilan Kremer, and Motty Perry
(*) includes old Appendices D and E, which are now part of the paper
Hart, Kremer, and Perry (2016),
"Evidence Games with Randomized
Rewards"
Abstract
An evidence game is a strategic disclosure game
in which an informed
agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which
ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The
agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high
as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the
reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup
where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show
that under natural conditions related to the evidence structure and
the inherent prominence of truth,
the two setups yield the same outcome.
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First version: February 2014
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American Economic Review 107 (2017), 3, 690-713
(with Online Material: Appendix C)
doi/10.1257/aer.20150913
See also:
Last modified:
© Sergiu Hart