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Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem
Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem
Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, and Sergiu Hart
Abstract
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without
monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity
constraints. There
is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided.
Rather, each provided good
must justify its cost, leading to strong complementarities
in the "preferences" of goods.
Furthermore, goods that are in high demand
given other already-provided goods must
also be provided. The question of the existence
of a stable solution (a menu of public
goods to be provided) exhibits a rich combinatorial structure.
We uncover sufficient
conditions and necessary conditions
for guaranteeing the existence of a stable solution,
and derive both positive and negative results for strategyproof stable matching.
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