Dynamics and Equilibrium
(A Presentation)
Sergiu Hart
Presidential Address at GAMES 2008, The Thirld World Congress of the
Game Theory Society
July 2008
Expanded and Revised: February 2009
Further expanded: 2009, 2013
Abstract
An overview of a body of work on dynamical systems in multi-player
environments. On the one hand, the natural informational restriction
that
each participant does not know the payoff functions of the other
participants — "uncoupledness" —
severely limits the possibilities to
converge to Nash equilibria. On the other hand, there are simple
adaptive
heuristics — such as "regret matching" —
that lead in the long run to
correlated equilibria, a concept that embodies full rationality.
Connections to behavioral economics, neurobiological studies, and
engineering, are also mentioned.
Papers:
-
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell,
"A Simple Adaptive Procedure
Leading to Correlated Equilibrium",
Econometrica 68 (2000), 5, 1127-1150
-
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell,
"A General Class of Adaptive Strategies",
Journal of Economic Theory 98 (2001), 1, 26-54
-
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell,
"Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium",
American Economic Review 93 (2003), 5, 1830-1836
-
Sergiu Hart,
"Adaptive Heuristics",
Econometrica 73 (2005), 5, 1401-1430
-
Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell,
"Stochastic Uncoupled
Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium",
Games and Economic Behavior, 57 (2006), 2, 286-303
-
Sergiu Hart and Yishay Mansour,
"How Long to Equilibrium?
The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled
Equilibrium Procedures",
Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2010), 1, 107-126
-
Sergiu Hart,
"Nash Equilibrium and
Dynamics", Games and Economic Behavior 71 (2011), 6-8
- Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell,
Simple Adaptive Strategies: From
Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, World Scientific (2013)
Some technical
information on the presentation
Last modified:
© Sergiu Hart