Sergiu Hart / presentation / Two (!) Good To Be True

Two (!) Good To Be True
(A Presentation)

Sergiu Hart

Acrobat PDF file

February 2012
Revised: May 2012, July 2012, October 2012, June 2013, May 2014, June 2017, June 2024

How to sell goods optimally? While the mechanism-design literature has solved this problem neatly when there is only one good, the multiple goods case turns out to be extremely difficult, mathematically and conceptually. Much of what is true for one good does not extend to multiple goods. We will try to explain the difficulties, show what can go wrong, and then present some universal approximation results. The talk is essentially self-contained; no background in mechanism design is necessary.

Papers:

Sergiu Hart and Phil Reny, "Revenue Maximization in Two Dimensions"
Sergiu Hart and Phil Reny, "Maximizing Revenue with Multiple Goods: Nonmonotonicity and Other Observations"
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan, "Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items"
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan, "The Menu-Size Complexity of Auctions"
Sergiu Hart and Noam Nisan, "How Good Are Simple Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods?"

Some technical information on the presentation

Two (!) Good To Be True (A Presentation) Sergiu Hart

Two (!) Good To Be True
(A Presentation)

Sergiu Hart